AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE UNDER POLITICAL PRESSURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC SECTOR AUDIT QUALITY IN EMERGING DEMOCRACIES

Abstract

This study aims to analyze the influence of political pressure on auditor independence and its implications for public sector audit quality within the context of developing democracies. A qualitative approach was employed, utilizing a literature review method to examine relevant scholarly sources concerning auditor independence, political influence, public governance, and audit quality. The analysis focuses on the forms of political pressure that may compromise auditor objectivity, the institutional factors that determine an auditor's capacity to maintain independence, and the consequences of such pressure for the credibility of audit findings and the accountability of state financial management. The findings indicate that political pressure can undermine auditor independence by influencing the prioritization of audits, restricting access to information, interfering with the reporting of findings, and threatening the career stability of auditors. Such conditions can diminish audit quality, weaken external oversight functions, and erode public trust in government institutions. Conversely, a legal framework that guarantees the autonomy of audit institutions, ensures transparency in the audit process, provides protection for auditors, and strengthens professionalism and institutional accountability mechanisms can help minimize the impact of political intervention. This study asserts that enhancing public sector audit quality depends not only on the technical competence of auditors but also on an institutional environment capable of safeguarding professional independence from political interests. Therefore, strengthening auditor independence must be an integral component of governance reform and the development of an accountable democracy.